Sequential Games

Rohit Prasad ()
Additional contact information
Rohit Prasad: Management Development Institute Gurugaon, Economics and Public Policy

Chapter 4 in A Case-Based Approach to Game Theory, 2026, pp 95-134 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter explores games in which players move one after another rather than simultaneously. It introduces rollback (or backward induction) equilibrium, a powerful method for solving such games by reasoning backward from the final move. Applications include the telecom war between Airtel and Jio, the strategic rhetoric of the 2016 US elections, and India’s demonetization policy. A key focus is on threats and promises—strategic tools that only influence outcomes when they are credible. Case studies such as the Central Bank-Finance Ministry dynamic and the challenge of law enforcement under populist pressures illustrate how timing and commitment shape sequential decisions. The chapter concludes with a brief reflection on how democratic processes like elections reveal the limits of non-cooperative logic in achieving transparent political outcomes.

Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-981-95-4302-1_4

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789819543021

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-95-4302-1_4

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().