Games in Extensive Form

R. K. Amit ()
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R. K. Amit: Indian Institute of Technology Madras

Chapter Chapter 5 in Game Theory with Applications in Operations Management, 2024, pp 85-104 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Chapter 3 detailed theGames!in extensive formnoncooperative games in which the players move simultaneously. Another way in which many strategic actions arise in everyday life, as well as in economics, involves players moving sequentially. For example, an investment made today may produce certain strategic advantages in the future. Such situations are modeled using extensive-form games. We discussed extensive-form games in Sect. 2.2.2 . We start with some examples to demonstrate the elegance with which temporal problems can be represented with the help of an extensive-form game tree.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-99-4833-8_5

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