Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox

Maria Montero

A chapter in Advances in Collective Decision Making, 2023, pp 159-171 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract It is well known that being the proposer or agenda setter is advantageous in many collective decision-making situations. In the canonical model of distributive bargaining (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989), proposers are certain of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in the coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper, I show that it is possible for a party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and be better off as a result. This appears paradoxical, even more so since the recipient never includes the donor in its proposals. The example shows that, even though actually being selected to propose is always valuable ex post, having a higher probability of being proposer may be harmful.

Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Bargaining in Legislatures: A New Donation Paradox (2010)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_10

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