Strategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy

Markus Brill () and Vincent Conitzer ()
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Markus Brill: University of Warwick
Vincent Conitzer: Carnegie Mellon University

A chapter in Advances in Collective Decision Making, 2023, pp 69-84 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Models of strategic candidacy analyze the incentives of candidates to run in an election. Most work on this topic assumes that strategizing only takes place among candidates, whereas voters vote truthfully. In this article, we extend the analysis to also include strategic behavior on the part of the voters. We also study cases where only candidates or only voters are strategic. We consider a setting in which both voters and candidates have single-peaked preferences and the voting rule is majority-consistent, and we analyze the type of strategic behavior that is required in order to guarantee desirable voting outcomes.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-031-21696-1_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_5

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