Meta-agreement and Rational Single-Peaked Preferences

Olivier Roy () and Maher Jakob Abou Zeid ()
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Olivier Roy: University of Bayreuth
Maher Jakob Abou Zeid: European Commission

A chapter in Advances in Collective Decision Making, 2023, pp 85-93 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We revisit the claim that rationality requires participants in deliberation to form single-peaked preferences once they have reached meta-agreements. We provide two different arguments that cast doubts on this claim. The first points out the rationality of having non-single-peaked preferences in cases where consuming two goods together is less valuable than consuming each of them individually. The second argument fleshes out the notion of meta-agreements in terms of reasons supporting a particular structuring dimension. These arguments show that to the extent that deliberation fosters the formation of meta-agreements and the formation of single-peaked preferences, the bridge between these two notions might not be solely a matter of rational preference formation.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-031-21696-1_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_6

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