On the Individual and Coalitional Manipulability of q-Paretian Social Choice Rules

Fuad Aleskerov, Alexander Ivanov (), Daniel Karabekyan and Vyacheslav Yakuba ()
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Alexander Ivanov: HSE University
Vyacheslav Yakuba: HSE University

A chapter in Advances in Collective Decision Making, 2023, pp 95-111 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We study the degree of individual and coalitional manipulability of q-Paretian social choice rules under Impartial Culture. Manipulability is defined as a situation, when an agent or a coalition, which consists of some agents, misrepresents her/their preferences to obtain a better outcome of the social choice rule. We study a class of q-Paretian social choice rules, which consists of four rules: Strong q-Paretian simple majority rule, Strong q-Paretian plurality rule, Strongest q-Paretian simple majority rule, and Condorcet practical rule. For the cases of 3, 4, and 5 alternatives and for the cases from 3 to 100 agents, we use computer modelling to calculate a number of manipulability indices. We provide the analysis of the results for different cases.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-031-21696-1_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_7

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