Effectiveness, Decisiveness, and Success in Weighted Voting Systems: Collective Behavior and Voting Measures

Werner Kirsch ()
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Werner Kirsch: FernUniversität Hagen

A chapter in Advances in Collective Decision Making, 2023, pp 115-141 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Efficiency, decisiveness, and success in a voting system depend not only on the voting rules but also on the collective behavior of the voters. The voting behavior is modeled by a voting measure which describes the interdependence (or independence) of the voters. In this paper, we define and investigate a large class of voting measures. This class can be characterized as those voting measures which are invariant under permuting the voters and which allow a natural extension to an arbitrary number of voters. The class includes the Penrose–Banzhaf measure (independent, impartial behavior), the Shapley–Shubik measure (impartial anonymous behavior). We analyze the efficiency and the success for these voting measures in weighted voting systems.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-031-21696-1_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_8

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