Different Country, Different Electoral System; Agendas

Harrie de Swart () and Stefan Wintein ()
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Harrie de Swart: Tilburg University
Stefan Wintein: Erasmus University Rotterdam

Chapter Chapter 1 in Elections and Fair Division, 2025, pp 1-22 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Different countries use different electoral systems, all of which aim to help shape a democratic constitutional state. We distinguish cardinal vs ordinal voting on the one hand and proportional vs non-proportional representation on the other hand. In concreto, we discuss the Dutch list system of proportional representation using Plurality Rule (PR) (most votes count) where the whole country is conceived as one district vs the non-proportional British system based on many districts, where in each district Plurality Rule (PR) is used to determine the winner. In both systems voters are supposed to cast only one vote—hence, we speak of cardinal voting—and the party with most votes is the winner. The British district system causes that the distribution of seats over the parties is non-proportional to the number of votes the party received. In countries like Malta and Australia voters are asked to give much more information than just their first preference: voters in these countries may give their individual preference orderPreference order over the candidates and hence we speak of ordinal voting. The Single Transferable Vote (STV) system, used for instance in Malta, results in proportional representation, while the Alternative Vote (AV) system, used for instance in Australia, gives a non-proportional representation, again because the country is divided into districts. We also discuss the French presidential electoral system. All electoral systems presented, although designed with the best intentions, turn out to be seriously defective. Finally, we will show that designers of an agenda for decision making can achieve their preferred outcome by a smart agenda design.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-06010-5_1

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