Cooperative Game Theory

Harrie de Swart () and Stefan Wintein ()
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Harrie de Swart: Tilburg University
Stefan Wintein: Erasmus University Rotterdam

Chapter Chapter 11 in Elections and Fair Division, 2025, pp 249-286 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In order to model a fair division problem as a (weighted) bankruptcy problem, we need to know the exact amount and strength of the claim of each individual agent. For quite a few fair division problems, however, that information is not available. Cooperative game theory can be used to model situations where claims belong, first and foremost, to groups of agents. In this section, we present a concise introduction to the basics of cooperative game theory and we explain the importance of this discipline for claims-based fair division. In particular, we focus on the Shapley value, a prominent and well-known solution value (allocation rule) for cooperative games.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-06010-5_11

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