Preference Based Division Problems

Harrie de Swart () and Stefan Wintein ()
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Harrie de Swart: Tilburg University
Stefan Wintein: Erasmus University Rotterdam

Chapter Chapter 12 in Elections and Fair Division, 2025, pp 287-296 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we discuss fair division problems based on preferences of the persons involved. How to divide a cake or land fairly, when different persons have different preferences for parts of the cake or land, is the topic of the first section. Important properties are proportionality, envy-freeness, equitability and efficiency. In the second section we present the Adjusted Winner procedure and the Proportional Allocation procedure of Brams and Taylor (Fair Division: From Cake-cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), both having attractive properties. In particular the Adjusted Winner procedure is an easy to understand procedure that can solve many disputes in, for instance, divorce settlements, resulting in outcomes that for both partners are better than a fifty-fifty division.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-06010-5_12

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