Arrovian Aggregation and Strategy-Proof Social Choice

Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
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Clemens Puppe: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Arkadii Slinko: University of Auckland, Department of Mathematics

Chapter Chapter 10 in Condorcet Domains, 2026, pp 183-190 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Closed Condorcet domains not only preclude intransitivities in pairwise majority voting, they are also endowed with a large class of further aggregation rules satisfying Arrow’s independence condition.

Date: 2026
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-15116-2_10

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