Constructions of Large Condorcet Domains

Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
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Clemens Puppe: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Arkadii Slinko: University of Auckland, Department of Mathematics

Chapter Chapter 8 in Condorcet Domains, 2026, pp 159-176 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Maximal Condorcet domains historically have attracted a special attention since they represent a compromise which allows a society to always have transitive collective preferences and, under this constraint, provide voters with as much individual freedom as possible.

Date: 2026
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-15116-2_8

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