Strategyproofness and Egalitarian Equivalence

Youngsub Chun

Chapter Chapter 7 in Fair Queueing, 2016, pp 79-92 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, Q J Econ 92:671–687, 1978) together with queue-efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. First, we provide a complete characterization of the family of rules satisfying the three axioms together. Although there is no rule in this family satisfying budget balance, feasible rules exist and we characterize the family of all such rules. We also show that it is impossible to find a rule satisfying queue-efficiency, egalitarian equivalence, and a stronger notion of strategyproofness, called weak group strategyproofness.

Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-33771-5_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5_7

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