Subgroup Additivity

Youngsub Chun

Chapter Chapter 8 in Fair Queueing, 2016, pp 93-113 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Subgroup additivity requires that a rule assigns the same expected “relative” utility to each agent whether an agent’s expected relative utility is calculated from the problem involving all agents or from its subproblems with a smaller number of agents. In this chapter, we investigate its implications for the queueing problem. As a result, we present characterizations of five important rules: the minimal transfer rule, the maximal transfer rule, the pivotal rule, the reward-based pivotal rule, and the symmetrically balanced VCG rule. In addition to some basic axioms and subgroup additivity, the characterization results can be obtained by additionally imposing either a strategic axiom or an equity axiom.

Keywords: Cost Agent; Equal Treatment; Budget Balance; Subgroup Additivity; Feasible Allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-33771-5_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5_8

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