Allotment According to Preferential Vote: Ecuador’s Elections

Victoriano Ramírez
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Victoriano Ramírez: University of Granada

A chapter in Mathematics and Democracy, 2006, pp 189-204 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we show results for some unipersonal and pluripersonal elections in Ecuador and in Spain, observing that the used methods can be replaced by better ones. We present a method for individual elections based on one-on-one comparisons, and preferential voting. This method verifies CONDORCET and PARETO, and it is furthermore better than the Two Round method. For multicandidate elections we give proportional and monotone methods based on preferential vote. We also analyse the electoral system of Ecuador and propose alternatives for it.

Keywords: Electoral Systems; Preferential Vote; Borda; Condorcet; Sample Transferable Vote; Proportionality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-35605-9_14

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-35605-3_14

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