 Zhang Jia’ao’s Bank Management in the Beijing Government Era: Central Bank Independence Reconsidered from Chinese Historical PerspectiveHiroaki Morota ()
A chapter in Money Doctors Around the Globe, 2024, pp 115-131 from Springer Abstract: Abstract In the era of the Beijing government (January 1912–June 1928), banknotes had not yet established their credibility partly because military governments often forced banks to extend loans, which in turn led to the excessive issuance of banknotes. Under such circumstances, Zhang Jia’ao, who held various important financial positions, including serving as deputy governor of the Bank of China, Chairman of the Beijing Bank Association, and a director of the National Loan Bureau, led the privatization of the Bank of China and the reorganization of the national loan redemption fund for improving the management of the Bank of China and establishing the credibility of banknotes. Zhang Jia’ao linked the improvement of the Bank of China's management to the formation of financial order, embodying dual roles as both a bank manager and a ‘money doctor’ in this era. Through this empirical analysis, this chapter provide an example of the role of a ‘money doctor’ in a world without a credible government. Date: 2024 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stechp:978-981-97-0134-6_7 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-981-97-0134-6_7 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Studies in Economic History from Springer |
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