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Electoral Reform in Italy and Japan: Unanticipated Outcomes?

Ethan Scheiner () and Filippo Tronconi ()
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Ethan Scheiner: University of California
Filippo Tronconi: University of Bologna

Chapter Chapter 6 in A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform, 2011, pp 97-113 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract During the 1980s and into the 1990s, citizens in Italy and Japan grew fed up with the politics of their country. The elite politician class of both countries faced problems of accountability and corruption. Finally, news of scandals in both countries in the early 1990s provided the impetus for substantial institutional change. By 1994, both Italy and Japan reformed the rules they used to elect politicians, with both countries instituting mixed-member electoral systems that provided simultaneously for a candidate-based single member district (SMD) tier and a larger seat magnitude proportional representation (PR) tier.

Keywords: Electoral System; Party System; Proportional Representation; Liberal Democratic Party; Electoral Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4419-7228-6_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-7228-6_6

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