Constitutional Change: No Escaping Hayek

Donald J. Boudreaux ()
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Donald J. Boudreaux: George Mason University

Chapter Chapter 6 in Public Choice, Past and Present, 2013, pp 81-88 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Is there a tension between the “constitutional design” implications of The Calculus of Consent, as well as of Buchanan’s other works on constitutional economics, and Buchanan’s and Tullock’s appreciation for the creative potential of spontaneous-ordering forces? I argue that there is indeed such a tension – one so strong that, in the end, there is no escaping Hayekian conclusions.

Keywords: Social Dilemma; Constitutional Rule; Unanimity Rule; Unanimous Agreement; Simple Majority Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4614-5909-5_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-5909-5_6

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