James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock: A Half-Century On

William Shughart

Chapter Chapter 8 in Public Choice, Past and Present, 2013, pp 101-123 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock both have contributed extensively, independently, and importantly to the scholarly literatures of, inter alia, political philosophy and economics, as well as to various subfields thereof, including public finance, law and economics, and bioeconomics. But the two are forever joined and probably best known as the coauthors of The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, published in 1962, which launched the modern disciplines of public choice and that of its sister, constitutional political economy. This chapter singles out and summarizes, in an idiosyncratic way, three key areas of Buchanan and Tullock’s work that have influenced my own thinking and scholarly writings, namely, the costs associated with collective decision-making, the rent-seeking insight, and analyses of public budget deficits and the public debt.

Keywords: Public Choice; Public Debt; External Cost; Simple Majority Rule; Oversight Committee (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4614-5909-5_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-5909-5_8

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