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Nigeria’s National Assembly Seen as Part of the Problem

Anthony Staddon
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Anthony Staddon: University of Westminster

Chapter Chapter 4 in Anti-Corruption Evidence, 2020, pp 69-90 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Legislative oversight in any democracy is essential to limiting the exercise of power and ensuring the accountability of government. This chapter reports the findings of an empirical study into legislative oversight in Nigeria with particular emphasis on the National Assembly’s oversight of the anti-corruption framework. Based on interviewer-led and self-administered questionnaires completed by 48 respondents in early 2016/17, our research reveals that Parliament is still seen as part of the problem of corruption in Nigeria despite the presence of a number of oversight tools at its disposal.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-030-14140-0_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-14140-0_4

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