Lobbying through Gifts

Maximilian Alex Kuntze () and Vanessa Mertins ()
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Maximilian Alex Kuntze: University of Vechta
Vanessa Mertins: University of Vechta

A chapter in The Political Economy of Lobbying, 2023, pp 201-219 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Politicians, decision-makers, and public servants may be influenced by lobbyist gifts, which they receive or have the prospect to receive, resulting in detrimental effects on the fulfillment of their official duties. This paper provides an overview of how gifts given by lobbyists lead to influence by reviewing experimental evidence on various mechanisms that cause bias and distortions in attitudes, beliefs, judgments, decisions, and behavior. Additionally, it outlines factors that inhibit self-deception processes and discusses policy implications.

Keywords: Gift exchange; Reciprocity; Corruption; Self-deception; Distorted beliefs; Distorted decisions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-44393-0_10

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_10

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