The Evolution of Modern Democracy as a Process of Constitutional Lobbying

Thomas Apolte ()
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Thomas Apolte: University of Münster

A chapter in The Political Economy of Lobbying, 2023, pp 247-265 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This article tackles the stepwise institutionalization that occurred as a representation of the nobility’s interest vis-à-vis the medieval monarchs. This institutionalization first bred estates of the countries, which, over time, evolved into parliaments. The article demonstrates how the thus induced aristocratic power-sharing structures within narrow aristocratic elites made the democratization processes of the nineteenth century resilient against backlashes and how this contributed to the astounding sustainability of contemporary Western democracies.

Keywords: Democratization; European history; Monarchy; Parliamentarianism; Self-enforcing democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-44393-0_12

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_12

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