Lobbying in Russia

Sebastian Hoppe and Alexander Libman ()
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Sebastian Hoppe: Freie Universität Berlin
Alexander Libman: Freie Universität Berlin

A chapter in The Political Economy of Lobbying, 2023, pp 339-360 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter reviews the scholarship on lobbying in Russia. Neither in the Russian legal system nor in social and political practice can lobbying be clearly distinguished from corruption or the (il)legitimate pursuit of interests. Consequently, we discuss lobbying on the basis of four research perspectives that highlight different aspects of state–business relations: oligarchic lobbying in the 1990s, lobbying under authoritarianism since the 2000s, lobbying in foreign economic policy, and lobbying under sanctions since 2014.

Keywords: Russian politics; Oligarchs; Authoritarianism; Protectionism; Economic expansion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-44393-0_16

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_16

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