Lobbying in China

Thomas Heberer ()
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Thomas Heberer: University of Duisburg-Essen

A chapter in The Political Economy of Lobbying, 2023, pp 361-384 from Springer

Abstract: Summary This chapter provides an overview of lobbying in the People’s Republic of China, taking private enterprises as a case study. Today, lobbying is an important component of private entrepreneurs’ strategic behavior, not least for the purpose of political protection and the pursuit of economic interests. A distinction is made between lobbying through formal channels such as People’s Congresses, business associations, chambers of commerce and industry associations, and lobbying through informal channels (networks, alumni associations, business clubs, etc.). Private entrepreneurs are members of a wide variety of networks, which facilitates entrepreneurs’ access to various political, social, and economic fields, as well as lobbying and policy influencing.

Keywords: Lobbying; China; Private entrepreneurs; Formal and informal channels; Strategic action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-44393-0_17

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_17

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