Who Did Protective Legislation Protect? Evidence from 1880

Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman
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Fred Bateman: University of Georgia

Chapter Chapter 5 in Public Choice Analyses of American Economic History, 2018, pp 87-134 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Beginning in the 1840s many states passed laws mandating the compulsory education of children and regulating the work of women and children although these were far from universal by 1880. In this paper, we focus on the impact of hours laws, especially those for women. Scholars have raised serious questions about the effectiveness of these laws because of doubts about enforcement mechanisms and whether or not the laws were binding. Moreover, it has been questioned as to whether these laws were simply passed as part of rent-seeking behavior by those not covered by the laws, in particular, adult men. In response, many of the laws covering adult women have now been rolled back. One state, Massachusetts, however, did pass an effective law in 1874 that resulted in the (successful) prosecution of at least one politically powerful corporation. Here, we investigate the impact of these laws using establishment level data for 1880. The historical record is consistent with rent-seeking by men but not for the purpose of disadvantaging women. The historical record is consistent with rent-seeking by men but not for the purpose of disadvantaging women. Rather, men pressed the case for women and children to secure benefits that they were apparently unable to achieve on their own. This was possible because, at the time, women and children were complements to male labor rather than substitutes. We find that there were systematic variations in hours from industry to industry, between city and countryside and regionally and that violations of the laws was not uncommon. Larger firms such as those in urban areas or those employing large numbers of the affected group were, however, more likely to be in compliance, particularly in Massachusetts. The evidence for Massachusetts also suggests, albeit very weakly, that the magnitude and certainty of penalties for violating the law may have been a major factor determining compliance with the law.

Keywords: Legal Day; Session Laws; Maximum Hourly; Child Labor Laws; Shorter Hours (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Whom Did Protective Legislation Protect? Evidence From 1880 (1991)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-77592-0_5

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