EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Political Selection of Federal Reserve Bank Cities

Jac Heckelman and John H. Wood ()
Additional contact information
John H. Wood: Wake Forest University

Chapter Chapter 6 in Public Choice Analyses of American Economic History, 2018, pp 135-153 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The Federal Reserve Act (1913) established the Reserve Board Organization Committee (RBOC) to determine the number and location of Federal Reserve districts and Reserve banks. Some scholars argue that the decisions were politically motivated but direct econometric evidence is lacking. A regression model utilizing solely political variables correctly predicts 11 of the 12 selected cities; the exception being Cleveland’s selection over Cincinnati. Our results present direct evidence of the importance of political determinants for RBOC selection.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-319-77592-0_6

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319775920

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-77592-0_6

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-20
Handle: RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-319-77592-0_6