Judicial Independence: Evidence from the Philippine Supreme Court (1970–2003)

Desiree Desierto

A chapter in The Political Economy of Governance, 2015, pp 41-57 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Is the Philippine Supreme Court independent from the Executive branch? Using data from Haynie et al.’s (High courts judicial database version 1.2, 2007) High Courts Judicial Database, I compare how each of the ten Chief Justices from 1970 to 2003 decides cases involving the national government 2 years prior and 2 years after their appointment as Chief Justice, in a difference-in-differences framework. To verify whether differences could be due to selection bias from the possible non-random assignment of cases and strategic timing of decisions, I also verify whether panels that did not include the Chief Justice exhibit differences in behavior during the same 4-year time periods. I find that they do not. In contrast, it is only the panels that include the Chief Justice which show some significant differences in the probability of favoring the government in its decisions pre- and post-appointment of the Chief Justice.

Keywords: National Government; Agency Behavior; Lower Court; Agent Relationship; Supreme Court (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpocp:978-3-319-15551-7_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_3

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