Elections with International Relations Dominance

Jan Klingelhöfer ()
Additional contact information
Jan Klingelhöfer: RWTH Aachen University

A chapter in State, Institutions and Democracy, 2017, pp 193-203 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Under what conditions is international cooperation possible when the participating countries have incentives to deviate from their promises? With the current problems in the governance of the European Union this important question has new relevance not only for political scientists, but also for economists who have to understand what type of economic cooperation is politically sustainable even in the face of adverse shocks.

Keywords: Prime Minister; Discount Factor; International Cooperation; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Equilibrium Path (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stpocp:978-3-319-44582-3_8

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319445823

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-44582-3_8

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().