U.S. Postal Markets and Delivery Liberalization: A Simulation Approach

Margaret M. Cigno and Edward S. Pearsall ()
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Margaret M. Cigno: Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC)
Edward S. Pearsall: Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC)

A chapter in The Changing Postal and Delivery Sector, 2017, pp 161-189 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The likely outcomes of liberalizing, or adapting regulations to already liberalized postal markets, are important concerns for many incumbent postal operators. Entry into liberalized postal markets can be analyzed as a simultaneous game with Nash equilibria with the incumbent as price leader if entry occurs. This approach can be extended to encompass multi-product markets, to accept alternative economic objectives, to accommodate various kinds of regulatory controls and to cases where the incumbent is not the price leader.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Postal Operator; Postal Market; Product Combination; Limit Price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:topchp:978-3-319-46046-8_11

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-46046-8_11

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