Sollten Zentralbanken unabhängig sein? Ergänzungen zu Stefan Schäfer

Arne Heise and Stefan Schäfer ()

Wirtschaftsdienst, 2014, vol. 94, issue 6, 416-419

Abstract: This article extends the inspection of Central Bank Independence (CBI) with respect to inflation performance to an examination of the relationship between CBI and economic welfare in general. The common view of monetary neutrality, i.e. a “free lunch” of CBI with respect to economic growth and employment, is contested on the basis of neo- and post-Keynesian theories of policy interactions and market constellations. Nevertheless, the fact has to be taken seriously that there is a broad discussion under way about the merits of CBI. The defenders of CBI must be on the lookout against a broad political and scientific offensive against the cornerstones of “German stability culture”. Copyright ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s10273-014-1689-3

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