Applying modelling in the process of anti-corruption expertise of legal regulation of public procurement
A. Ivanov and
S. Maslova
No 6382, Working Papers from Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University
Abstract:
The paper proves a necessity of changing the approach to anti-corruption expertise: the assessment of affordability of the best society's alternative in terms of regulation proposed by the principal (ex ante impact assessment) has to be preceded by the analysis of opportunities for mala fide agent's behavior and evaluation of incentives for his bona fide behavior. In the paper two different algorithms of anti-corruption expertise have been introduced: the first one is applied to the new regulation tool, the second one - to the regulation tool which has been used and some information on agent’s reaction is available. In both cases the expertise starts from the modelling of society's preferences and comparing them with the principal's preferences generated by the proposed regulation. The second algorithm used by the authors in the anti-corruption expertise applies the price English auction in public procurement.
Keywords: public procurement; corruption; anti-corruption expertise; the Principal-agent model; quasi-corruption; auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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