An Algorithm for Simulation of a Corrupt / Quasi-Corrupt Behavior

Andrey E. Ivanov

No 831, Working Papers from Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University

Abstract: The paper researches the hypothesis of buyer's quasi-corruptive behavior, in particular while using English auctions for purchasing of differentiated goods. In that case the bona fide public buyer is trying to limit competition in favor of the pre-selected supplier, in order to avoid the auction risks. Executive summary is available at pp. 37.

Keywords: public procurement; principal-agent model; corrupt behavior; quasi-corrupt behavior; государственные закупки; модель «принципал-агент»; коррупция; квази-коррупция (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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