Economic Analysis of Judicial Conciliation in Brazilian Financial Institutions

Anna Cláudia De Vasconcelos, Mathias Tessmann and Humberto Nunes Alencar

Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, 2024, vol. 14, issue 4, 6

Abstract: The present work aims to analyze the economic efficiency of judicial conciliation in defaulted credit contracts, through a case study of a major Brazilian financial institution, between the years 2014 and 2019. From the perspective of the economic analysis of law, this study analyzes the efficiency of conciliation in collective settlement events organized by the Federal Court, using three methods of assessment: maximization of gains and minimization of costs, Pareto efficiency, and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. The results indicate that conciliation, when successful, demonstrates economic efficiency; however, as a public policy, it does not achieve indices compatible with the advantages stemming from its adoption. These findings contribute to the scientific literature that studies alternative dispute-resolution methods by providing empirical evidence for financial institutions and policymakers in the sector. Â JEL classification numbers: K10, K12, K15, K41.

Keywords: Economic Analysis of Law; Pareto’s efficiency; Kaldor-Hicks criterion; Judicial Conciliation; Economic Efficiency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.scienpress.com/Upload/JAFB%2fVol%2014_4_6.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spt:apfiba:v:14:y:2024:i:4:f:14_4_6

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Applied Finance & Banking from SCIENPRESS Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Eleftherios Spyromitros-Xioufis ().