EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Bail-in expectations for European banks: Actions speak louder than words

Alexander Schäfer, Isabel Schnabel and Beatrice Weder di Mauro

No 7, ESRB Working Paper Series from European Systemic Risk Board

Abstract: The declared intention of policy makers is that future bank restructuring should be conducted through bail-in rather than bail-out. Over the past years there have been a few cases of European banks being restructured where creditors were bailed in. This paper exploits these events to investigate the market reactions of stock prices and credit default swap (CDS) spreads of European banks in order to gauge the extent to which it is expected that bail-in will indeed become the new regime. We find evidence of increased CDS spreads and falling stock prices most notably after the bail-in in Cyprus. However, bail-in expectations appear to depend on the sovereign’s fiscal strength, i. e., reactions are stronger for banks in countries with limited fiscal space for bail-out. Moreover, actual bail-ins lead to stronger market reactions than the legal implementation of bank resolution regimes, supporting the saying that actions speak louder than words. JEL Classification: G21, G28

Keywords: bail-in; bank restructuring; creditor participation; event study; Single Resolution Mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.esrb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/wp/esrbwp7.en.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:srk:srkwps:20167

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ESRB Working Paper Series from European Systemic Risk Board 60640 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Official Publications ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-17
Handle: RePEc:srk:srkwps:20167