Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
Michael Finus (),
Marko Lindroos,
Gordon Munro and
Pedro Pintassilgo
No 2008-11, Stirling Economics Discussion Papers from University of Stirling, Division of Economics
Abstract:
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher are the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. Moreover, the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of production cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency.
Keywords: straddling fish stock; regional fisheries management organizations; unregulated fishing; bioeconomic model; coalition formation model; free-riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-06
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http://hdl.handle.net/1893/510
Related works:
Journal Article: Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (2010) 
Working Paper: Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (2008) 
Working Paper: Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (2008) 
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