Matching with batches

Pablo Guillen, Rami Tabri and Edward Wang

No 2024-13, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics

Abstract: We propose a modification of the University Admissions Centre (UAC) mechanism to allow preference lists to be submitted in batches until the applicant is matched to a seat. Batching eliminates truncation and thus recovers strategy-proofness, allowing for the clearinghouse to provide simple advice. The current UAC mechanism uses a constrained list, giving incentives to students to strategize. We test the efficiency of our modification in an individual decision-making matching experiment in which we compare the batched mechanism with the current mechanism, with and without advice. Results show that while the batched mechanism exhibits greater efficiency for student welfare, better advice is required to improve truth-telling and thus avoid suboptimal matches.

Date: 2024-06, Revised 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-exp and nep-inv
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