Executive turnover in UK firms: the impact of Cadbury
Elisabeth Dedman
Accounting and Business Research, 2003, vol. 33, issue 1, 33-50
Abstract:
This study examines whether the Cadbury Committee recommendations regarding board structure have increased the power of boards to replace poorly performing CEOs. It also looks at whether institutional investors have become more proactive in this regard post-Cadbury. The study employs a comprehensive sample of UK listed firms between 1990 and 1995. Firm performance, CEO ownership and institutional ownership are found to be significantly related to the probability of non-routine top executive turnover. It appears that the managerial labour market is disciplining managers more quickly after Cadbury. However, there is no evidence that this is because boards have become more likely to remove CEOs following poor performance. Neither is any evidence found to support the assertions of institutional investors who claim to be more proactive since Cadbury. It is concluded that neither the Cadbury board structure reforms, nor the professed change in behaviour of institutional investors, has reduced the agency problem of managerial entrenchment in large UK firms.
Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00014788.2003.9729630 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:acctbr:v:33:y:2003:i:1:p:33-50
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RABR20
DOI: 10.1080/00014788.2003.9729630
Access Statistics for this article
Accounting and Business Research is currently edited by Vivien Beattie
More articles in Accounting and Business Research from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().