Investor relations, information asymmetry and market value

Vineet Agarwal, Richard J. Taffler, Xijuan Bellotti and Elly A. Nash

Accounting and Business Research, 2016, vol. 46, issue 1, 31-50

Abstract: Evidence to date on the market value of investor relations (IR) strategies is limited. We test the market relevance of IR activity directly employing a proprietary database measuring IR quality across all firms listed on NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ. Although, in theory, ‘repackaging’ and communicating existing information should have no market impact, we find that firms with higher quality IR strategies are rewarded with significantly higher valuation multiples. In addition, increase in IR quality is associated with increases in analyst following and liquidity. Overall, our findings are generally stronger for small firms which are more likely to be ‘neglected’. Our evidence is consistent with effective IR successfully raising firm visibility leading to enhanced recognition and reduced information asymmetry in line with Merton (1987) and thus ‘fairer’ firm valuation as argued by IR professionals.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1080/00014788.2015.1025254

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