CEO inside debt, income smoothing, and stock price informativeness

Sydney Qing Shu

Accounting and Business Research, 2021, vol. 51, issue 1, 65-95

Abstract: I examine whether the informativeness of income smoothing varies with the extent to which the CEO holds inside debt (i.e. pension benefits and deferred compensation). I document that for firms where the CEO holds less inside debt, income smoothing reduces stock price informativeness. This result suggests that CEOs with lower inside debt smooth earnings to conceal firms’ underlying economic performance. I also find that the negative effect of income smoothing on stock price informativeness for firms whose CEOs hold less inside debt is more pronounced when firms have higher debt financing, lower analyst coverage, or weaker corporate governance.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1080/00014788.2020.1798735

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