Why do firms disclose analyst following on their corporate websites?

Afshad J. Irani and Irene Karamanou

Accounting and Business Research, 2024, vol. 54, issue 6, 649-672

Abstract: About two-thirds of S&P500 firms disclose their analyst following on their corporate websites. Half of these firms disclose their analyst following in an unbiased fashion, while the rest manage this disclosure by selectively omitting analysts with pessimistic views (selective disclosers). Consistent with facing stronger incentives to manage expectations, coupled with weaker information environments and monitoring by external stakeholders, selective disclosers exhibit lower profitability, higher growth opportunities, stronger financing needs and a greater percentage of retail investor ownership. Moreover, selective disclosers experience lower future returns and exhibit higher income smoothing and lower accrual quality. Taken together, our evidence is consistent with some firms attempting to serve their strategic needs by selectively excluding from their websites analysts with less favourable views of their firm.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00014788.2023.2226854 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:acctbr:v:54:y:2024:i:6:p:649-672

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RABR20

DOI: 10.1080/00014788.2023.2226854

Access Statistics for this article

Accounting and Business Research is currently edited by Vivien Beattie

More articles in Accounting and Business Research from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().