Corporate tax avoidance and trade credit
Mostafa Monzur Hasan and
Ahsan Habib
Accounting and Business Research, 2024, vol. 54, issue 6, 700-729
Abstract:
We examine the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and reliance on trade credit. Using a sample of US listed firms during the period 1987–2017, we show that tax-avoiding firms rely more on supplier-provided trade credit as a source of financing. We take advantage of the ‘check-the-box’ regulation introduced in 1997 as an exogenous shock to firms’ tax strategies. The findings from the difference-in-differences design suggest a causal interpretation of our results. We also observe that the relationship between tax avoidance and trade credit is more salient for a sub-sample of firms with: (i) more information asymmetry; and (ii) more financing constraints. These findings remain robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses and endogeneity concerns. In an additional analysis, we find that corporate tax avoidance increases firms’ reliance on trade credit by reducing access to bank loans. Overall, we provide evidence that tax avoidance has important implications for a valuable alternative source of financing: trade credit.
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:acctbr:v:54:y:2024:i:6:p:700-729
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DOI: 10.1080/00014788.2023.2196052
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