Does contract enforcement matter for international lending?

Wasseem Mina ()

Applied Economics Letters, 2006, vol. 13, issue 6, 359-364

Abstract: Contract enforcement plays an important role in international lending. The hypotheses that better contract enforcement increases the level and lengthens the maturity of international debt are examined. Panel data are used for 83 developing and emerging market economies for the period 1982-1997 to examine these hypotheses. The empirical evidence supports these hypotheses.

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1080/13504850500394350

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