Per-unit bidding rules and buyer under-performance in natural resource sales

Frank Rusco and W. Walls

Applied Economics Letters, 2007, vol. 15, issue 2, 79-83

Abstract: In this article, we examine the role of per-unit bidding rules on firm-level contractual performance. In particular, we test the hypothesis that buyers will act on incentives to under-perform when bids are accepted in per-unit form. The empirical application uses data from per-unit auction sales of US Forest Service timber. The statistical analysis indicates that buyers systematically undercut when per-unit bids exceed the value of individual units of timber.

Date: 2007
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Working Paper: Per-unit bidding rules and buyer under-performance in natural resource sales (2014)
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DOI: 10.1080/13504850600705901

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