The economics of terrorism against two targets

Kjell Hausken

Applied Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 19, issue 12, 1135-1138

Abstract: A terrorist without capacity constraints attacks two independent targets. As the target defence efficiency decreases, the target first increases its defence, and thereafter decreases and eventually does not defend because of the high cost. With terrorist capacity constraints, targets become interdependent. The attack gets gradually shifted towards the most vulnerable target. When only the most vulnerable target is attacked, only the nonattacked target benefits relatively.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2011.615729

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