On the inauspicious incentives of the scholar-level h-index: an economist’s take on collusive and coercive citation

M. Ryan Haley

Applied Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 24, issue 2, 85-89

Abstract: Faculty renewal, promotion, tenure, merit and awards are typically tied to scholarship performance, which is often measured in several ways, among them citation-based metrics like the scholar-level h-index. With the relatively recent developments of ‘one-touch’ Google Scholar citation tracking and Harzing’s Publish or Perish Software, it is simple to monitor and potentially game one’s personal h-index. This article explores this possibility by assessing the incentives embedded in the scholar-level h-index through the lens of cartels, uncertainty, insurance and game-theoretic best response.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2016.1164812

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