International arbitration of investment disputes: are poor and badly governed respondent states more likely to lose?

Julian Donaubauer and Peter Nunnenkamp

Applied Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 25, issue 5, 321-325

Abstract: Compelling empirical evidence on whether investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) is systematically biased against poor respondent states hardly exists. We focus on disentangling the effects of the respondent state’s per-capita income and the strength of domestic rule of law on ISDS outcomes. We find that both higher income and stronger than ‘normal’ rule of law reduce the probability of investor wins in international arbitration of disputes.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2017.1319557 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:25:y:2018:i:5:p:321-325

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2017.1319557

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().