 The president and asymmetric use of informationBong Hwan Kim Applied Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 26, issue 14, 1214-1217 Abstract: While presidents try to allocate resources to their interests in budgeting process, they have limited power to influence because the government budget is approved by the legislative body. This study investigates whether presidents asymmetrically use information on the efficiency of programs to allocate more resources to their interests. Specifically, I focus on leftover funds in the government reporting. Growing leftover funds indicate inefficiency of the programs as they are the results of lack of demand or operational problems in implementation. Using data from the Korean government, I find that the change of leftover funds of programs and the following year’s budget has a negative relation only when the change of leftover funds is negative, which suggests that the efficiency of the program improves. This phenomenon becomes more salient when the programs are related to the president’s political interests. This suggests that presidents allocate resources to the programs of their interests by asymmetrically using the information on efficiency. This study contributes to the extant literature by identifying one of the presidents’ tools to affect the budgeting process. Date: 2019 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:26:y:2019:i:14:p:1214-1217 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1543933 Access Statistics for this article Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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