Divided government in Latin America

Peter Calcagno and Beatriz Maldonado

Applied Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 27, issue 12, 1010-1015

Abstract: The literature on divided government focuses on the relationship between divided government and its size and has found that governments are limited when divided government exists. Fewer studies have examined the conditions that will generate a divided government. Theoretical research argues that voters want to moderate power. This study attempts to determine if the same factors that predict a divided government in the US explain divided government in Latin America. We use a continuous measure of divided government in 15 Latin American countries from 1981–2010. We find that countries in LA with midterm elections moderate power during concurrent elections when inflation is increasing. However, they are more likely to vote in a unified government during midterm elections when there are poor economic conditions. Countries with no midterm elections, moderate power when the economy is doing well but are more likely to choose a unified government when inflation and unemployment are increasing.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2019.1657555

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