Information asymmetry in small and medium enterprise credit guarantee schemes: evidence from Japan

Kuniyoshi Saito and Daisuke Tsuruta

Applied Economics, 2018, vol. 50, issue 22, 2469-2485

Abstract: In this article, we investigate whether there is adverse selection and/or moral hazard in credit guarantee schemes for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Japan. As credit guarantee corporations cannot distinguish low risk from risky borrowers, credit guarantee schemes typically attract a larger proportion of risky borrowers, which results in inefficient resource allocation. Using bank-level data, we analyse whether the default rate is positively associated with the ratio of guaranteed loans to total loans, and find that the data are consistent with an adverse selection and/or moral hazard hypothesis. Further analysis shows that the relationship is stronger for 100% coverage than for 80% coverage, indicating that the ‘20% self-payment’ requirement somewhat mitigates the problem, but not enough to eliminate it altogether.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2017.1400651

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