The effect of land tenure governance on technical efficiency: evidence from three provinces in eastern China
Yuepeng Zhou,
Xiaoping Shi,
Nico Heerink and
Xianlei Ma
Applied Economics, 2019, vol. 51, issue 22, 2337-2354
Abstract:
This study aims to identify the mechanisms through which land tenure governance affects the technical efficiency of grain production in an integrated framework and to examine the impacts of the public governance, village self-governance, and relational governance of land tenure on the technical efficiency of contracted land and rented-in land. Farm-level survey data collected from Liaoning, Jiangxi, and Jiangsu provinces covering the years of 2014 and 2015 is used for the empirical analysis. The findings indicate that (i) public governance associated with land certification significantly increases the technical efficiency of grain production; (ii) village self-governance and administrative land reallocations can serve as substitutes for the land rental market in optimizing the distribution of land resources and improving technical efficiency; and (iii) compared to multi-year transfer contracts, both annual and open-ended transfer contracts have negative impacts on technical efficiency.
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00036846.2018.1543941 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:applec:v:51:y:2019:i:22:p:2337-2354
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEC20
DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2018.1543941
Access Statistics for this article
Applied Economics is currently edited by Anita Phillips
More articles in Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().